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THE  COLLAPSE of the Soviet empire  has created an unprecedented  op- 
portunity  for political  and economic reform  in Eastern  Europe  and the 
former  Soviet Union (FSU). In response, the Group  of Seven industrial- 
ized democracies  (G-7) has asked the two main international  financial 
institutions (IFIs)-the  World Bank and the International  Monetary 
Fund (IMF)-to  assume a leadership  role in providing  loans to the re- 
gion. (Private  capital  flows are expected to be relatively  small.)  Current 
estimates suggest that the IFIs may be responsible  for close to half of 
overall  planned  aid to the FSU. Recently, the IMF announced  plans to 
lend $25 billion  to $30 billion to the FSU over the next four years; the 
World Bank is expected to pitch in an additional $12 billion to $15 
billion.  I 
With  the great  technical  expertise  of their  staffs, the IFIs should  play 
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a major  role  in developing  structural  reform  programs  in the countries  of 
the former  Soviet bloc. However, that role is a separate  issue from the 
form in which aid to the region should  be provided.  Would  nonconces- 
sional  IFI loans be best-or  would conditional  grants  be better? 
Perhaps  the most straightforward  rationale  for relying so heavily on 
IFI loans is that  the IFIs are  generally  thought  of as being  senior  to other 
creditors,  at least in the traditional  sense that debtors  give preference  to 
IFIs in allocating  debt repayments.  Because IFI loans are likely to be 
substantially  repaid,  the loans cost the donors  relatively  little and at the 
same time provide  a good way for the donor  countries  to leverage their 
aid. That is, IFI loans may provide a great deal of money now at little 
cost in present  value to donors. An added  benefit  of using  IFI loans as a 
conduit for aid is that they appear  to provide a simple mechanism  for 
equitably  dividing  costs among donor nations; an industrialized  coun- 
try's IMF and World Bank quotas are closely related to its share of 
world  output,  and  its quotas  in turn  provide  the basis for its share  of as- 
sistance. 
A considerable  part  of our  paper  is devoted to asking  whether  official 
loans, especially  IFI loans, truly  are senior  debt  and, if so, in what  sense. 
This is a central  issue in our burden-sharing  calculations  and our ques- 
tion about  whether  IFI loans are the best way to leverage aid to Russia 
and other former  Soviet bloc countries. Moreover, the seniority  ques- 
tion has broader  implications  for the general  structure  of development 
assistance. 
We begin by showing that the burden-sharing  implications  of IFI 
loans to the FSU are likely to bear  little resemblance  to countries'  quo- 
tas in the World  Bank and the IMF. In particular,  Germany  is likely to 
bear a far greater  burden,  compared  to the United States, than the two 
nations' IFI quota shares would suggest. Germany's  problem  is that it 
holds a far  greater  stake in the existing  $70  billion  debt of the FSU. 
Let us assume a conventional  "me-first"  model of seniority  in which 
the relative seniority  of different  creditors  does not affect expected re- 
payments.  Then the total cost of each dollar  in new loans to the FSU is 
equal to one minus the marginal  value of debt. (The marginal  value of 
debt is the increase in total expected repayments  to creditors  when a 
country's  debt  rises by one dollar.)  Our  empirical  analysis  indicates  that 
creditors  as a whole would lose on the order  of 90 cents for each dollar 
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In the event that IFI debt truly is senior, Germany,  which holds 43 
percent of existing FSU debt, would bear a disproportionately  huge 
share  of this cost-even  though  its IMF quota is only one-third  that of 
the United  States. The cost to the United States, which holds very little 
debt of the FSU, would  be negligible. 
In fact, we doubt  that IFI loans are senior  in the conventional  sense; 
both our  theoretical  bargaining  analysis  and our empirical  work suggest 
that official  loans are better thought  of as receiving  equal priority  with 
private  loans. Even in this case, a new IMF loan would still cost Ger- 
many  far more  than  the United States as a percentage  of GDP:  in abso- 
lute terms,  the costs would  be about  equal. Only  if the aid package  were 
structured  so that a large  fraction  of any receipts were used to pay old 
debts would  the United States bear  the brunt  of new loans. In that  case, 
Germany's  benefit  might  exceed its contribution. 
The second part  of the paper  explores the general  issue of the senior- 
ity of debt  held  by official  creditors  (the IFIs and  governments).  We start 
by examining  the net repayment  records  of official  and  private  creditors 
in severely indebted  middle-income  countries  during  the debt crisis. We 
find  that  private  creditors  have been much  more  successful  in extracting 
cash than official creditors-except  for the IMF, which does equally 
well. However, this evidence is not decisive because there is no direct 
measure of the loss official creditors are expected to take on their in- 
creased  exposure. 
We develop a more  direct  test of whether  official  creditors  as a group 
are senior  (in the conventional  "me-first"  sense) by estimating  the effect 
of the share  of debt  held by official  creditors  on the price  of private  debt. 
Because official  creditors sometimes voluntarily  extend extra loans to 
problem debtors, we use an instrumental  variables estimation tech- 
nique. We construct  an instrument  for the share of official  debt, based 
on the relative  currency  appreciation  of a country's official  and private 
debts. One  cannot  reject  the hypothesis  that  official  creditors  as a group 
receive  equal  priority  with private  creditors. 
But even if official  creditors  as a group  are not senior, it is clear that 
the IFIs must  be preferred  creditors  in some sense. After all, in recent 
years the IMF has managed  to extract significant  net repayments  from 
even the most depressed parts of the world-including $4 billion  from 
Sub-Saharan  Africa  from 1985  to 1990-when  many of these countries 
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even if the IFIs always  get repaid  (in an accounting  sense), this does not 
necessarily  imply  that  they are senior  in a sense that would be costly to 
private  creditors  and debtor  countries. Rather,  any ability  IFIs have to 
extract  repayments  ahead  of private  creditors  may  come almost  entirely 
at the expense of bilateral  government  creditors. 
To illustrate  this idea, we develop a simple  bargaining  model  of sover- 
eign  debt  in which  negotiations  occur  among  debtor  countries  and  multi- 
lateral, bilateral, and private creditors. The multilateral  institutions 
have "me-first"  seniority;  thus any agreement  that  gives the other  credi- 
tors money must involve full repayment  of the multilaterals.  However, 
the bilateral  leaders share interests with the multilaterals  because the 
same industrialized-country  political  leaders  who control the bilaterals 
have enormous  sway over multilateral  policy. Our  bargaining  model  im- 
plies that while the multilaterals  may indeed  be repaid  first, most of the 
funds effectively come out of the pockets of the bilaterals,  rather  than 
the debtor  country  or private  creditors.  In the extreme  case in which  the 
interests  of the multilaterals  and  the bilaterals  are  perfectly  aligned,  mul- 
tilateral  seniority  is irrelevant. 
We show that our model appears  to apply quite closely to the situa- 
tion of many aid recipients. In a very significant  number  of cases, the 
IFIs have been repaid  not by borrowers,  but by other official  creditors. 
The implication  is that private  creditors  have little to fear from IFI se- 
niority. 
Finally, we touch on the issue of whether  the IFIs might  be filling  in 
missing  international  loan markets  because they possess a superior  en- 
forcement technology that enables them to extract credible commit- 
ments  for debt  repayments  that  other  creditors  cannot.  Put  another  way, 
this theory implies  that the marginal  value of official  debt can be higher 
than the marginal  value of private  debt. Our  empirical  tests of conven- 
tional "me-first"  seniority  cannot adequately  address  this question. We 
argue,  however, that the global  evolution  of world  capital  markets  over 
the past twenty years makes the missing market hypothesis much 
weaker  than  it was in the years  following  the Bretton  Woods  agreements 
that launched  the IMF and the World  Bank. Both the theoretical  argu- 
ments and the empirical evidence presented here lead us to doubt 
whether  official  creditors  as a group  have the will to exploit any superior 
enforcement  technology they may possess in global bargaining.  How- 
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Table 1.  External Long-Term Debt of Eastern European Countries, Year-End 1990 
Millions of U.S.  dollars, except  where noted 
Total debt per capita 
Countiy  Debt to private creditors  Total  debt  (U.S. dollars  per capita) 
Bulgaria  9,452  9,564  1,060 
CSFRa  5,001  5,346  340 
FSUb  36,900  56,800  200 
Hungary  15,331  18,046  1,700 
Poland  11,527  39,282  1,030 
Romania  0  19  0 
Yugoslavia  10,108  17,352  730 
Source: World Bank (1991a, vol.  2) and World Bank (1990). 
a.  Czech and Slovak  Federal Republic 
b.  Debt  of  the  former Soviet  Union  is  an average  of  three  estimates  from  the  World Bank  Qiuarterli'  Review, 
December  1991. Private debt of the FSU  is unguaranteed commercial  bank debt plus suppliers'  credits. 
The Marginal Value of Debt and the Cost of New Loans 
A number  of the Eastern  European  countries  have inherited  a legacy 
of external  debt  from  the communist  era, as table 1  illustrates.  Bulgaria, 
Hungary,  and Poland had debts in excess of one thousand  dollars per 
capita  in 1990.  But even the republics  of the FSU, with a relatively  mod- 
est debt burden  of $200  per person,  face severe problems  servicing  their 
external  debts. As of February  1992,  prices for Russian  debt to private 
creditors  had  fallen  below 40 cents on the dollar.  Economic  and  political 
turmoil  in the FSU, as well as disputes over allocating  the old Soviet 
debts  among  the republics,  are  making  it difficult  for the newly emerging 
republics  to gain access to private  external  capital. 
Thus  it appears  unlikely  that all the old Soviet debts will be repaid  in 
full. Why should  this matter  in analyzing  the consequences of new IFI 
loans, if they will be paid ahead  of other creditors?  The reason is clear: 
the total burden  to creditors  from a new package  of loans depends not 
on the average  value  or seniority  of the new loans, but  rather  on the mar- 
ginal  value  of debt.2 
A simple  example illustrates  the marginal  debt concept. Consider  a 
debtor  that  owes $50 billion  but that can repay  only $20 billion;  its debt 
2. The fundamental  distinction  between  the marginal  and average  value of sovereign 
debt, and  the differences  from  the case of corporate  debt, are emphasized  in Bulow and 
Rogoff  (1988,  1989).  The  classic example  is the 1988  Bolivian  buyback,  discussed  in Bulow 
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should  sell on the secondary  market  at 40 percent  of face value (20/50). 
The country  finds a new creditor  (donor)  willing  to lend it $1 billion to 
buy wheat. The new creditor  suffers  an immediate  loss of roughly  $600 
million  because it has traded  $1 billion  for a new claim  worth  only about 
$400  million. But other creditors  also suffer  a loss because the country 
can still repay only $20 billion, regardless  of whether  the face value of 
its debt is $50  billion  or $51 billion.  Thus the $400  million  in repayments 
that  the new creditor  expects to receive must  effectively come out of the 
pockets of the old creditors;  their holdings  will drop in value from $20 
billion  to $19.6  billion. In this special  case, the value of marginal  debt to 
creditors  as a whole is zero. However, the point that existing creditors 
suffer  a capital  loss is quite  general. 
To illustrate  this point mathematically,  suppose that the amount  of 
a debtor's income available  for repayment  is a random  variable  0 with 
probability  density  functionf(0). A country  will  partially  default  if 0 < D, 
where D  is the face value of the country's total external debt. Let p 
be the average value of a country's debt. Then the total market  value 
of a country's debt, pD,  is given by 
(1)  pD  f  0  Of(o)dO  + Dfof(0)d0  =  f4Of(o)dO + D(1  -  F(D)), 
where f0  Of(0)dO  captures  the expected repayments  to creditors  in de- 
faulting  states and  D(1  -  F(D))  is the face value of the debt times the 
probability  the debt will be repaid  in full. The marginal  value of debt, m, 
is the change  in the total market  value of debt when  D rises by a dollar; 
m  d(pD)/dD.  Taking  the derivative  of both sides of equation 1 with 
respect to D, we find that m =  (1 -  F(D)). 
The key point  is that  creditors  benefit  from  an  extra  dollar  of debt  only 
if the country  is able and  willing  to repay  more  than  D. Thus, to creditors 
as a group, the net cost of an extra dollar in loans is (1 -  m). Note  that 
this result is independent  of the seniority  of the additional  debt. If new 
IFI loans were sufficiently  senior  that  they are  certain  to be repaid  in full, 
then existing creditors would lose  the entire (1  -  m). If new IFI loans 
were of equal priority  to the average  existing loan, then the IFIs would 
suffer an immediate  loss of (1 -  p) and the old creditors would lose 
(p -  m). Either way, the total loss would still be (1 -  m). 
In the case where  all existing  debt is of equal  priority,  secondary  mar- 
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Table  2. Marginal  Value  of Debt, Selected  Eastern  European  Countries,  February  1992 
Cents per dollar  of debt 
Marginal  value of debt 
Countiy  Debt price  Specification  1  Specification  2 
Bulgaria  18  15  -3 
Hungary  70  39  41 
Poland  18  11  -3 
Russia  40  21  6 
Yugoslavia  30  27  1 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  using  debt  prices  from  Salomon  Brothers,  "Emerging  Markets  Debt  Weekly" 
(February 28,  1991), for Bulgaria, Poland,  Russia,  and Yugoslavia,  and Eurowieek (February 6,  1992) for Hungary. 
The marginal value of debt is calculated  with the following  equations: 
Specification  1: ni  =  p(l  +  31(DIX)), and 
Specification  2:  m  =  p(l  +  P2)  +  P2 p2> 
where PI =  -0.1  as estimated  in table 5, and  2=  -1.4,  as estimated  by Claessens  and others (1990). See  text for 
more information. Debt-export  ratio for Russia is EC estimate  for Soviet  Union from World Bank (1991a, vol.  1, p. 
95). Other debt-export ratios are from World Bank (1991a, vol.  2). All debt-export  ratios were multiplied by the ratio 
of total exports  to non-CMEA  exports.  These  ratios for all countries  except  Yugoslavia  are from Counity  Reports: 
Cenitral anid East  Eiurope 1991,  published jointly  by  Statistisches  Bundesamt  and Eurostat,  latest  year  available; 
Yugoslavia  ratio is from IMF, Direction  of Trade Annuiial  1991. 
will always understate  the aggregate  aid  burden  of new loans. The result 
that (1 -  p)  ?  (1 -  m) follows  immediately after dividing both sides of 
equation  1 by D: 
(2)  p =  1/Df  Of(O)dO  +  m -  m. 
A marginal  dollar  of debt  is worth  something  to creditors  as a whole only 
in the event that  the country  repays  in full. But the average  value  of debt 
p includes  the value  of any  payments  made  in the event of partial  default. 
These simple calculations,  of course, assume that debt repayments, 
0, are independent  of the face value of debt, so that the creditors'  gain 
from marginal  debt is the country's loss. However, a rise in debt may 
cause inefficiencies  by discouraging  domestic investment. In this case, 
the marginal  cost to a country  of higher  debt  may be less than  the gain  to 
creditors.  We will return  to this issue later. 
How does one go about  measuring  the marginal  values of debt  for the 
countries  of the former  Soviet bloc? One can obtain some indication  of 
average  debt values by looking at secondary  market  prices for former 
Soviet  bloc debt  to private  creditors  (keeping  in mind  that  the market  for 
most of these debts is not terribly  liquid).  The first  column  in table  2 lists 
some recent  indicative  prices  for debt for countries  in the former  Soviet 
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countries;  Bulgaria  and Poland's debts trade  for about 18 cents on the 
dollar,  whereas  Russia's and Hungary's  debts trade  for 40 and 70 cents 
on the dollar.  These prices suggest that a dollar  in new official  loans to 
Hungary  would have an aid component  of at least 30 cents; a dollar  in 
new loans  to Bulgaria  would  have an aid component  of at least 82 cents.3 
Average debt discounts, of course, only provide a lower bound to the 
total aid component  of new loans; to obtain estimates that include the 
capital  loss to existing creditors, one needs to know the value of mar- 
ginal  debt. 
Unfortunately,  marginal  debt values can not be observed directly. 
One approach  to estimating  marginal  debt  values is to look at the empiri- 
cal relationship  between secondary  market  prices and debt to estimate 
the function  p(D),  and then to derive the marginal  value of debt by the 
relationship  m  d(pD)/dD.  Alongside the secondary market  prices in 
table 2, we offer two alternative  estimates of marginal  debt for former 
Soviet bloc countries. The first  estimate is based on secondary  market 
regression  results  (presented  later  on) for specifications  of the form 
(3)  ln(p)  =  a  +  PI1(D/X)  +  exogenous  variables. 
From  equation  3, one can calculate  the marginal  value of debt as 
(4)  m = p( l  +  P1  (DIX)), 
where  DIX  is the country's  debt-export  ratio. Our  estimate  of P is - 0.1 
(from  table 5). The corresponding  values of m are presented  in the sec- 
ond column  of table  2. 
The third  column  in table 2 is based on results in specifications  pre- 
sented by Stijn  Claessens and  coauthors  and Daniel  Cohen:4 
(5)  ln (pl(1 -  P)) =  +  f2 ln (DIX) +  exogenous  variables. 
Using equation  5 to solve for the marginal  value of debt, one obtains 
(6)  m=P(1+3P2)-f32p2. 
Claessens and others estimated  P2  =  -1.4;  Cohen arrives  at a similar 
estimate (-  1.5). 
3. The price  for Hungarian  debt may  be somewhat  understated  because  Hungary  has 
retained  some access to credit  markets.  However, as of April  21, 1992,  Hungary  was as- 
signed  only a BB + rating  by Standard  and  Poor's, roughly  the same  as India. 
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Thus the secondary  market  prices, shown in the first  column  of table 
2, provide an upper  bound on the value of new loans to Eastern  Euro- 
pean countries. The second and third  columns provide a range  of esti- 
mates  for the actual  cost-the  marginal  value  of debt. Note that some of 
the numbers  in the third  column  are actually  negative.  This is a theoreti- 
cal possibility  if the country  is on the wrong  side of the famed  "debt  Laf- 
fer curve." (This is the case where the overhang  of foreign  debt so im- 
pedes the country's incentives to invest that creditors would actually 
enjoy higher  expected repayments  if they unilaterally  forgave  part  of the 
debt. As a practical matter, this seems unlikely for any of countries 
shown in the table.5)  In any event, the low marginal  values of debt in 
table 2 imply  that the total burden  of new loans to most Eastern  Euro- 
pean countries  will be close to the burden  of outright  grants,  regardless 
of whether  the new lenders  are senior  or not. 
Calculating  the Burden-Sharing  of Aid to Russia 
Marginal  and average  debt values play a central  role in determining 
the cost and  distribution  of new aid to the countries  of the former  Soviet 
bloc. The fundamental  issue is that a donor  country's true contribution 
to an  aid  package  is not simply  its direct  contribution,  but  also the capital 
loss its suffers  on existing  debt holdings. 
As a base case, we will assume that  all debt receives equal  priority  in 
repayment.  Then the approximate  cost Cj to countryj of an aid package 
consisting  of L in loans and G in grants,  but conditional  on debt repay- 
ments  R, is given by 
(7)  C, =  qjL(I  -  p)  +  sjL(p  -  m)  +  qjG  -  sjR(l  -  m>), 
where  qj  is the fraction  of new loans and  grants  that  donorj provides  and 
sj is the proportion  of existing  debt held byj. The first  term  on the right- 
5. A necessary  but not sufficient  condition  for a debt Laffer  curve to exist is for the 
overhang  of foreign  debt to impede  the debtor  country's  incentive  to invest. If this is the 
case, then  the  marginal  benefit  to the  debtor  of receiving  new loans  is less than  the marginal 
cost to donors.  Some of the aid is dissipated  by increased  inefficiency  in domestic  invest- 
ment.  If debt  overhang  disincentives  are  indeed  a problem,  then  new loans  are  probably  a 
less efficient  way  to provide  aid  than  grants  would  be. Warner  (1992)  presents  some  empiri- 
cal estimates  on the importance  of debt overhang.  Bulow and Rogoff  (1991b)  discuss the 
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hand  side of equation  7, qjL (1 -  p), represents  the immediate  loss from 
making  loans worth  less than  par. The second term,  sPL(p  -  m), repre- 
sents the capital  loss suffered  by existing  creditors  when total  debt rises. 
The third  term is country  j's  share of the grants. Finally, debt repay- 
ments provide the creditor  with the sum sjR. However, a debt repay- 
ment  of R will reduce  the total value  of remaining  debt  by mR, so the last 
term on the right-hand side of equation 7 is -  s1R  (1 -  m). 
To implement  equation 7 and thereby calculate the distribution  of 
burdens  associated  with  any  given aid  package  for each donorj, it is nec- 
essary to estimate  p, m, the share  of new debt  or grants  donorj  provides, 
qj, andj's shares  of existing  debt, sj. Although  data  on the distribution  of 
debt are not available  for all the Eastern European  countries, they are 
available  for the republics  of the FSU, so we will focus on the case of 
Russia. 
As of the end of 1990,  the G-7 countries  held 78.7 percent  of Russian 
debt.6  Recall  from table 2 that  p for Russia  is about  0.40. Our  estimates 
for m for Russia range  from 0.06 to 0.21. In the calculations  below, we 
will use an intermediate  estimate7 of m  =  0.10. 
In table 3, we use equation  7 to estimate  the relative  burden  three  hy- 
pothetical  aid packages  to Russia  would  place on the G-7  countries.  The 
first  package  is a $1  billion  IMF  loan. (In  this calculation,  we assume  that 
this loan is comparable  to having  each industrialized  country  member  of 
the IMF make a loan in proportion  to its IMF quota.8)  As the third  col- 
6. The republics  still are negotiating  about  how to distribute  the FSU's debt;  prelimi- 
nary  negotiations  leave Russia  with  85 percent  of the total. In our  calculations,  we assume 
that  the  distribution  of creditors  for  Russian  debt  is the same  as the  distribution  of creditors 
for the debt  of the former  Soviet Union. Although  comprehensive  data  on country  shares 
of debt  for Eastern  European  countries  are  not available,  Germany  reputedly  holds  a simi- 
larly  large  share. 
7. This estimate  of m for the FSU was obtained  by averaging  the estimates  in table  2 
and the estimate  in Cohen  (1991).  The smaller  the difference  between  in and  p, the lower 
is Germany's  burden  from a new loan. By contrast,  the U.S. burden  is roughly  propor- 
tional  to (1 -  p) and  is almost  independent  of m. 
8. This implies  that each industrialized  country  is responsible  for a greater  share  of 
IMF  loans than  its quota  would  seem to indicate.  The reason  is that  the developing  coun- 
tries  hold  a substantial  fraction  of IMF  quotas,  but  make  only negligible  net hard-currency 
contributions.  For example,  Russia's  IMF quota  will be 3 percent,  or $5.4 billion,  under 
the next round  of funding  (the Ninth Review). However, Russia  will be required  to pay 
only a nominal  amount  in hard  currency.  Thus  for every billion  dollars  the IMF lends to 
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Table 3.  Burden-Sharing in Russia under Alternative Financing Arrangements 
Cost in millions  of U.S. dollars,  except where noted 
Share of  Share of 
new loans  existing  Loan pllis grant 
and grants  debt  $1 billion $1 billion  plus debt 
Cointiy  (per-cent)  (percenit)  loan  grant  l epaymenta 
Germany  9.7  42.8  187  97  -  101 
United States  31.2  1.0  194  312  493 
Japan  9.7  8.8  85  97  102 
United Kingdom  8.7  6.6  72  87  100 
France  8.7  10.9  86  87  74 
Italy  5.4  8.6  58  54  35 
Canada  5.1  0.0  31  51  81 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  See  text for more information. The following  assumptions  were  used: the price of 
Russian  debt  is  40 cents;  the  marginal value  of  debt  is  10 cents;  new  loans  and grants made by all industrialized 
couLntries  are  in  proportion  to  the  IMF  quota  under the  Ninth  Review;  new  and old  debt  have  equal  priority in 
repayment. Share of new loans and grants from Finianice  and Development,  December  1991, p. 29, and Ititern7ational 
Finianicial  Statistics,  1991 Ainnal.  Share of existing  debt held is from World Bank (1991a, vol.  1, p. 92). 
a.  The $1 billion in loans plus $1 billion in grants plus debt repayment arrangements assume repayment proportional 
to existing  debt. 
umn  of table 3 shows, even though  the United States has an IMF quota 
that  is three  times as large  as Germany's,  the two countries  bear  almost 
identical  burdens  from an IMF loan. The United States loses $187 mil- 
lion directly (60 percent of its $312 million  share of the loan) and loses 
another  $7 million  from  capital  losses on its existing  holdings  of Russian 
debt. Germany  loses only $58  million  directly  (from  its loan share  of $97 
million)  but suffers  $129  million  in capital  losses.9 
The second aid package  is for $1 billion  in grants.  For symmetry,  we 
again  assume that these grants  are made  in proportion  to the industrial- 
ized countries' IMF quotas. In this case, because there are no capital 
losses on existing debt, each country's economic burden  is simply  pro- 
portional  to the amount  of aid it directly  supplies.  10  (Since the G-7  coun- 
9. If the IMF's claims  have a higher  status  than  equal  priority,  then the U.S. burden 
decreases  and  the German  burden  increases.  However, regardless  of whether  the IMF  is 
senior  or  junior,  the total  cost to all creditors,  new and  old combined,  remains  at (1 -  in) 
times  the amount  of the new loan. 
10. The table  assumes  that  if a country  receives a no-strings-attached  grant,  its credi- 
tors  will not be able  to extract  any of the money. However,  as we show in Bulow  and  Ro- 
goff  (1988),  the  fraction  q that  creditors  can  take  is quite  small  in most  countries-not more 
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tries account  for 78.5 percent  of all industrialized-country  IMF quotas, 
their  share  of the $1 billion  in grants  is $785  million.) 
Finally, we consider  a package  that combines  $1 billion  in aid and $1 
billion in grants, but comes with the conditionality  that the Russians 
must  use half  the proceeds  for payments  to existing  debt holders.  In this 
case, the United States, which holds almost no Russian  debt, bears 49 
percent  of the total  burden.  The Germans,  as holders  of about  43 percent 
of the existing debt, benefit  greatly  from the debt repayment  provision 
and  come out about  $100  million  ahead. 
The preceding  analysis can be applied  to some of the alternative  aid 
packages  that have been proposed  for Russia. For example, on April 1, 
1992,  German  Chancellor  Helmut  Kohl  and  U.S. President  George  Bush 
announced  a $24  billion  aid  package. While  the exact details  are still be- 
ing negotiated,  it is clear that the vast bulk of the total-more  than 90 
percent-is  in bilateral  loans (such as loans from the Export Import 
Bank and the Overseas Private  Investment  Corporation)  and multilat- 
eral loans. (The preliminary  total includes roughly $6 billion in loans 
from  the IMF, the World  Bank, and  the European  Bank  for Reconstruc- 
tion and Development,11  $6 billion in loans for a currency-stabilization 
fund to be provided  through  the IMF's General  Arrangements  to Bor- 
row  facility, and  $12  billion  in bilateral  loans and  technical  assistance.  12) 
Given that  the Bush-Kohl  package  consists largely  of loans, the bur- 
den shares correspond  closely to the third (loan) column in table 3.13 
Applying  equation  7, we find  that although  the United States would be 
providing  substantially  more  of the loans and  grants  in the package  than 
any other country, the net cost to the United States of roughly  $4.5 bil- 
11. At present,  it appears  that  Russia  will receive an IMF quota  of 2.99 percent.  See 
Steven  Erlanger,  "$12  Billion  Is Planned  for Ex-Soviets,"  New  York  Times, April  12, 1992, 
p.  10. 
12. "Kohl  Welcomes  Russia  Aid, Urges All to Pay,"  Reuters  News Service, April  2, 
1992.  The primary  component  of the U.S. contribution  to this aid package  will be $4.85 
billion  in Commodity  Credit  Corporation  loans, $3.75 billion  of which had already  been 
disbursed  when  President  Bush  gave his speech. 
13. Because  General  Arrangements  to Borrow  (GAB)  quotas  differ  from  IMF  quotas, 
if the U.S. plan  of having  the stabilization  fund  financed  in proportion  to GAB shares  is 
adapted,  the United  States would  contribute  only 25 percent  of the stabilization  fund  and 
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lion would almost exactly match Germany's.  '4  Germany, of course, 
would  fare much  better  if the aid  package  were conditioned  on repaying 
existing  debts, as in the last column  of table 3. 
An important  assumption  underlying  our  calculations  of burden-shar- 
ing is that all new official  debt will receive equal  priority  with the coun- 
tries' existing debts to both official  and private  creditors.  This assump- 
tion justifies our use of secondary market prices for debt to private 
creditors  when we estimate  the average  and marginal  cost of aid. If offi- 
cial debt were senior  to debt  from  private  creditors,  our estimates  of the 
cost to G-7 governments  of new loans to Eastern European  countries 
would be much  lower;  junior private  creditors  would bear a dispropor- 
tionate  share  of the cost. This  is the sense in which  IFI loans, if they truly 
are senior, allow the G-7  governments  to "lever"  their  aid. 
In fact, considerable  controversy  exists over the issue of seniority  in 
international  lending.  Many  official  creditors,  especially  the multilateral 
aid agencies, argue  that country  debtors treat them as preferred  credi- 
tors. This is the premise underlying  the argument  that large IMF and 
World  Bank  capital  increases  only impose  a small  cost on donor  govern- 
ments. We examine the plausibility  of our equal  priority  assumption  in 
the next section. 
Testing the "Me-First"  Seniority of Official Debt 
It is commonly  assumed  that debt owed to official  creditors  is senior 
to debt owed private  creditors  in international  loans markets,  at least in 
the sense that  official  creditors  are  paid  first.  Superficially,  the data  seem 
to support  this assumption. During  the past 15 years, more countries 
have formally  defaulted  on private debts than on official debts. How- 
ever, this  fact is deceptive  because in many  cases, official  creditors  have 
been considerably  more willing  than private  creditors  to roll over their 
debts.  to problem-debtor  countries. To explore the issue of seniority 
more  thoroughly,  we begin by asking  how official  and private  creditors 
fared  in bankrupt  middle-income  countries  during  the debt crisis. 
14. For  purposes  of calculation,  we assume  that  the technical  assistance  (grant)  com- 
ponent  of the  package  is negligible;  for the United  States, the planned  technical  assistance 
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The Net  Transfer Record  of IFIs  versus Private  Creditors 
in the Debt  Crisis 
We will focus on the countries included  in the World  Bank's list of 
severely  indebted  middle-income  countries  (SIMICs).  15  The SIMICs  in- 
clude the relatively  large  problem-debtor  countries;  their debts consti- 
tute  a sizable  fraction  of the total  problem  loans  whose debts sell at steep 
discounts  on world secondary  markets.  Any creditor  serious about  get- 
ting  repaid  would  work hard  to do so in the SIMICs.  16  In table  4, we ex- 
amine net transfer  payments  (principal  plus interest repayments  minus 
new loans)  to various  groups  of creditors  as percent  of debt  owed by the 
SIMICs  from 1984-91. The top half of the table presents categories of 
official  creditors  and  the bottom  half  displays  transfer  rates  of return  for 
private  creditors. 
The basic message of table 4 is that private  creditors  have extracted 
considerably  higher  net repayments  than  have official  creditors  (except 
for the IMF in the sub-period 1986-91). Since 1984, private "guaran- 
teed"  debt (privately  held external  debt guaranteed  by the debtor-coun- 
try government)  has paid an average  of about  5.5 percent  in cash, while 
private  nonguaranteed  debt (privately  held external  debt not guaranteed 
by the debtor  country  government)  has paid  an average  of 11.9  percent, 
including  sizable principle  repayments.  17 The average  cash payment  on 
all privately  held debt was 6.4 percent. 
The IMF did only slightly  worse than  private  creditors.  After  provid- 
ing large sums to the problem-debtor  countries  after the debt crisis be- 
gan in 1982,  the Fund  extracted  an average  return  of 5.7 percent  of debt 
outstanding  from 1986-91. The World Bank, on the other hand, has 
15. The World  Bank's  most recent list of severely indebted  middle-income  countries 
includes  Algeria,  Argentina,  Bolivia, Brazil,  Bulgaria,  Republic  of Congo,  Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ecuador,  Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua,  Peru, Poland,  Syria, and Venezuela.  The list in 
the World  Debt Tables  changes  regularly;  see World  Bank  (199la). Chile  and Colombia, 
for example,  are  now listed  as moderately  indebted. 
16. It is for just such distressed borrowers  that private lenders design pari passu 
clauses, meant  to prevent  some other  creditor  from  getting  repaid  a disproportionate  frac- 
tion of its claim  in cash. 
17. In many  cases, government  guarantees  made  it more  difficult  for creditors  to press 
for  repayment  in the developing  country's  legal  system  and  more  difficult  for the debtor  to 
obtain  foreign  exchange  needed  for repayment. $  t  oJ  N  t~~~~  t1  oo  m  t  oo  m  a  ,~~c 
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never withdrawn  more  than 2.5 percent  in any year since 1983  from  the 
SIMICs,  despite its often-cited  repayments  from  Brazil. 
In table 4, we also net out side payments among multilaterals  and 
other  aid agencies  by looking  at net transfers  to all official  creditors.  As 
a group,  official  creditors  kept pouring  money into the SIMICs  through 
1987, more than five years after private creditors began pulling out 
wholesale. From 1988-91, official creditors began withdrawing  very 
modest amounts-an  average  of 0.6 percent per year. But if grants  are 
included  in the tabulation,  the industrialized  countries  are still transfer- 
ring  funds to the SIMICs. Based on this evidence, it would be hard  to 
argue  that official  creditors  as a group  have "me-first"  seniority  relative 
to private  lenders. 
Testing for  the Seniority of Official Debt 
Using Secondary  Market Prices 
It would seem unconventional  for a traditional  senior lender to in- 
crease its share  of debt in a bankrupt  country.  However, the increase  in 
the share  of official  debt in the debt crisis countries  does not prove that 
official  debtors  will ultimately  receive a lower return  than  private  lend- 
ers. Without  an estimate of the capital loss on new official loans and 
loans that were rolled over, there is no way to evaluate expectations 
about what percent  of remaining  official  debt ultimately  will be repaid. 
The capital  loss cannot be measured  directly  because no market  for of- 
ficial debt exists. Nevertheless, one may be able to extract some infor- 
mation  about  the relative  seniority  of private  and  official  debt  by looking 
at secondary  market  prices for developing  country  debt to private  cred- 
itors. 
We examine such evidence in table 5. For the period 1986-90, we 
look at annual  data  on secondary  market  prices for government-guaran- 
teed external  debt to commercial  banks  in 19  middle-income  countries. 
Except for our inclusion  of the share  of official  nonconcessional  debt in 
total long-term  debt, the specification  is fairly standard.18  The ordinary 
least squares  (OLS)  coefficient  on the country's  debt-export  ratio  is neg- 
18. See, for example,  Ozler  and  Huizinga  (1992),  Fernandez  and  Ozler  (1991),  Dooley 
and  Stone (1992),  and  Cohen  (1991).  Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1991b)  have  explored  more  disag- 
gregated  specifications  separating  the World  Bank,  IMF, and  bilateral  creditors  from  pri- 
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Table 5.  Regressions Explaining the Market Price of Developing Country Debt, 
Ordinary Least Squares and Instrumental Variables Estimates, 1986-90 
Or-dinary  least  squares  Instrumental  variables' 
Independent  variable  Levels  Differences  Differences 
Constant  5.38  -0.104  -  0.033 
(10.91)  (1.60)  (0.36) 
Debt-export  ratioa  -  0.063  -  0.089  -  0.093 
(2.78)  (1.61)  (1.68) 
Share of official debtb  0.0003  0.005  -0.017 
(0.06)  (0.34)  (0.73) 
Inflationc  -  0.00016  0.00007  0.00005 
(1.61)  (0.84)  (0.72) 
LIBORd  -0.149  -  0.166  -0.182 
(2.66)  (3.15)  (3.27) 
Arrearse  -  0.066  -0.041  -  0.053 
(6.69)  (2.41)  (2.62) 
Suimmary statistic 
Number of observations  85  65  65 
Adjusted R2  0.63  0.25  ... 
Standard error  0.41  0.30  0.31 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  The numbers in parentheses  are t statistics.  Data for 1986-90 are for the following 
countries:  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,  Costa Rica, Cote d'lvoire,  Ecuador,  Mexico,  Nigeria,  Panama, Peru, 
the  Philippines,  Poland,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  and  Yugoslavia.  Data  for  Algeria,  Hungary,  and Turkey  are  also 
included for available  years.  The dependent  variable, the end-of-year  secondary  market price of debt,  is the log of 
the  average  bid  and offer  prices  (from  Salomon  Brothers,  "Indicative  Prices  for  Less-Developed  Country  Bank 
Loans,"  December  2,  1986, December  14, 1987, December  8,  1988, December  7,  1989, and December  18, 1990, for 
all cases,  except  1989 for Hungary and Turkey,  and 1990 for Algeria and Hungary.  For these  cases,  prices are from 
Euroweek,  December  14, 1989 and December  13, 1990). 
a.  Debt-export  ratio is the ratio of year-end long-term debt outstanding and disbursed to total merchandise exports 
in the same year. (Debt figures from World Bank (1991a); 1991 exports  from World Bank (1991b), and 1990 exports 
from Initerniatiotial  Finianicial  Statistics.) 
b.  Share of official debt is the year-end percent of long-term debt held by official creditors,  excluding concessional 
debt (from World Bank (1991a, vol.  2)). 
c.  Inflation is the rate of change in the consumer price index (1991 value from World Bank (1991b) and 1990 value 
from Interntatiotnal  Finianicial  Statistics). 
d.  LIBOR  is  the  annual average  of  the  six-month  London  interbank offered  rate (from Itntertnatiotnal  Finaticial 
Statistics). 
e.  Arrears is the year-end percent of long-term debt in arrears (from World Bank (1991a)). 
f.  The  instrumental  variables  regressions  use  as  an instrument the  change  in the  official  debt  share caused  by 
exchange  rate effects.  See  text for more information. 
ative and highly significant,  as are the coefficients on the London in- 
terbank  offered  rate  (LIBOR)  and  the country's  accumulation  of interest 
arrears. 
The OLS coefficient  on the ratio of nonconcessional  official  debt to 
total long-term  nonconcessional  debt is small and statistically  insignifi- 
cant.'9  If official  debt were senior, one would expect a negative coeffi- 
19. It should  be noted  that  the significance  levels on the coefficients  may  be overstated 
if there  is serial  correlation  across  years  for each country;  this observation  only strength- 
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cient. Assuming  a conventional  model  of seniority,  the more  senior  debt 
there is relative  to junior  debt, the lower the return  to junior  debtors  in 
the event of default. 
To account  for possible serial  correlation  across years  for each coun- 
try, table 5 also reports  OLS estimates for the same regression  run in 
first  differences;  the coefficients  are quite similar  to the regressions  that 
use the levels of the variables.  Although  the results are not reported  in 
the table, we experimented  with separately  including  the shares  of IMF, 
World Bank (IBRD), and other official nonconcessional debt shares; 
none of these variables  is significant.  Overall,  we cannot reject the hy- 
pothesis that  the coefficient  is zero; that  is, that  official  and  private  debt 
receive equal  priority. 
One might  expect the OLS coefficient  on the share  of official  debt to 
be biased downward  if official creditors are more willing than private 
creditors  to make loans to debt-distressed  countries;  we already  have 
mentioned that official creditors assumed a larger share of problem- 
country  debt during  the debt crisis. To correct  for this downward  bias, 
table 5 also reports  instrumental  variables  (IV) regressions  for the first- 
difference regression.20  As an instrument,  we used the change in the 
fraction  of a country's debt owed to official creditors  that was caused 
purely  by changes  in the exchange  rates  of the differing  currencies  mak- 
ing up its private  and official  debts. Specifically,  we calculated  the ex- 
change  rate  effect on a country's  debt as 
(8)  Et = Dt-Dt_,+  R  -  Lt + Ft + At -  At_ 1,  (8)  Et  +PR 
where  Dt is the country's  debt at the end of period  t, L is the amount  of 
new loans, PR denotes principal  repayments,  F is the amount  of debt 
forgiven or debt reduction (from buybacks or other debt conversion 
schemes), and  At is interest  arrears  on long-term  debt.2'  We applied  the 
same procedure  separately  to official and to private debt. The instru- 
ment is then the realized  ratio  of official-to-total  debt in t, less what the 
20. In place  of secondary  market  prices, we also explored  using  the country  debt risk 
rating  survey published  by Institiutional Investor,  which has data  for a somewhat  larger 
sample  of countries.  The coefficient  on official  debt share  is negative  for the OLS regres- 
sion, but  becomes  positive  for the instrumental  variables  regression. 
21. Interest  arrears  are not included  in the World  Bank  (199la) measure  of long-term 
debt. Only  data  on total  interest  arrears  are available  in the World  Bank  (199la) data  set; 
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ratio  would  have been had  Et  been zero for  both  private  and  official  cred- 
itors. This instrument  thus purges  the official  debt share  change of any 
spurious  relation  with the debt price change  that might  be caused by an 
official  creditor  reaction  function. 
The results for the IV estimation  are reported  in the last column of 
table 5. The coefficient on the official debt share is now negative and 
somewhat  larger  in absolute  value  than  the previous  estimates, but it re- 
mains  insignificantly  different  than  zero.22 
Another  potential  problem  with the secondary  market  regressions  is 
that sample  selection  bias can occur;  countries  that  are in economic dis- 
tress are much  more  likely to trade  their  debt  on secondary  markets.  To 
deal with this issue, we adopt the sample selection approach  of Sule 
Ozler and Harry  Huizinga.23  Table 6 presents the results of the sample 
selection model;  the results  for the associated  secondary  market  regres- 
sions are similar  to those in table  5. The results  for the probit  part  of the 
sample  selection model  (the equation  in which  the dependent  variable  is 
1 for countries  whose debt trades and 0 for countries  whose debt does 
not trade)  provide  further  support  for the view that the share  of official 
debt is not a significant  determinant  of whether  a country's  debt trades 
at discount. 
Overall,  the statistical  evidence on secondary  market  prices does not 
provide  evidence that the official  creditors  as a group  are senior in the 
"me-first"  sense. 
The Relationship  between Multilateral and Bilateral Creditors 
Although  the preceding  statistical  evidence casts doubt on the con- 
ventional  view that official debt is senior, casual empiricism  still sug- 
gests that there must be some sense in which the IMF and World  Bank 
have priority.  Even though  the World  Bank  did not extract  net transfers 
from the SIMICs  at the same rate as private  creditors  during  the debt 
22. We used the estimated  IV equation  coefficient  on the debt-export  ratio  in table  5 
to estimate  m in our  earlier  aid  and  burden-sharing  calculations  in tables  2 and  3. The  coef- 
ficient  on the official  debt  share  change  is similarly  insignificant  when  its own lagged  value 
is used  as an instrument,  and  when  all the other  variables  in the regression  except LIBOR 
are  instrumented  out using  once-lagged  values. 
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Table 6.  Sample Selection Model Explaining the Occurrence of Trading and the Price of 
Debt in the Secondary Market, Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Trading  Price 
Independent  variable  equationa  equationb 
Constant  -  5.81  5.22 
(2.36)  (8.72) 
Debt-export  ratioc  1.12  -  0.05 
(4.85)  (1.65) 
Share of official debtd  0.008  -  0.0002 
(0.51)  (0.04) 
Inflatione  0.024  -  0.0001 
(3.58)  (0.35) 
LIBORf  0.30  -- 0.147 
(1.24)  (2.54) 
Arrearsg  . . .  -  0.066 
(6.42) 
Summaty statistic 
Rho  0.80 
(9.28) 
Number of observations  134 
Number of positive  observations  85 
Log likelihood  -78.25 
Source:  Authors'  calculations.  The  numbers  in parentheses  are t statistics.  Data  for  1986-90  for  the  following 
countries: debt traded in secondary  market-Algeria,  Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,  Costa Rica, Cote d'lvoire, 
Ecuador,  Hungary,  Mexico,  Nigeria,  Panama, Peru, the Philippines,  Poland,  Uruguay,  Venezuela,  and Yugoslavia, 
debt  not traded in secondary  market and with country  credit rating over  40 (according  to Itnstituitiotnal  Inv'estor)- 
China, Fiji, India, Indonesia,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Portugal, and Thailand. 
a.  The  dependent  variable  in the  trading equation  is  I if trading was  observed  in the  secondary  market,  and 0 
otherwise. 
b.  The dependent  variable is the log of the secondary  market price; see  table 5 for sources. 
c-g.  See  table 5 for description  of independent  variables. 
crisis, it has suffered  defaults  in only ten highly  distressed countries- 
Guatemala,  Guyana,  Honduras,  Liberia,  Nicaragua,  Panama,  Peru, Si- 
erra Leone, Syria, and Zambia-none  of whom paid much money to 
their  private  creditors,  either. 
In this section, we argue  that  it is a mistake  to think  of the World  Bank 
and IMF as totally separate  actors  from  bilateral  creditors;  after  all, the 
industrialized  countries  have a very large say over the IFIs' decisions. 
The question arises: do the IFIs' excellent repayment  records simply 
come at the expense of other  official  creditors?  To properly  analyze  this 
issue, it is necessary to develop a rudimentary  model of the bargaining 
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Who Pays for  IFI Repayments?  A Bargaining  Model 
Before we begin analyzing  debt bargaining,  it is helpful  to analyze a 
model in which there is no debt and there are no international  financial 
institutions.  For example,  suppose  that  France  and  Germany  bargain  bi- 
laterally about whether to continue open trade through  the European 
Community. 
Let S equal the total surplus  available  to the bargainers.  Let Uk(Sk) 
equal the utility of bargainer  k if the bargainer  receives Sk of the total 
available  surplus.  With  two bargainers,  S, +  S2 =  S in an efficient  con- 
tract. 
Then, normalizing  the utility  of each bargainer  to zero when no bar- 
gain  is struck,  the Nash bargaining  solution  is that  efficiency  is achieved 
and  that 
(9)  U'  (S,)/U,(S1)  =  U2(S2)1U2(S2). 
For example, if both bargainers'  utility  is linear  in S, then the surplus 
will be split  fifty-fifty.  But what  if the implementation  of the efficient  so- 
lution leads to one side's receiving more than half the surplus  (if there 
are no side payments)?  For example, what if free trade  between France 
and  Germany  is optimal,  but that such trade  would  give Germany  a sur- 
plus of $2 billion  more  than  France?  Then bargaining  theory would pre- 
dict a transfer  from  Germany  to France. In Europe, such a transfer  may 
be made  through  an agricultural  support  fund.  In the Third  World,  analo- 
gous transfers  may be paid  through  development  agencies. An example 
that  is similar  and, perhaps,  much  more  to the point, is the North  Ameri- 
can Free Trade  Agreement.  If efficient  implementation  involves giving 
Mexico a disproportionate  share  of the benefits, transfers  to the United 
States may take place in the form of repayments  on Mexican debt to 
U.S. creditors. 
We now develop a one-shot bargaining  model in which a debtor  may 
already  have some loans outstanding  from multilateral,  bilateral, and 
private  creditors.  Any loans left outstanding  at the end of the game are 
written  off.24 
24. Our  model  here is strictly  a static  one. For dynamic  analyses  of debt bargaining, 
see Bulow  and  Rogoff  (1989),  Fernandez  and Rosenthal  (1990),  Fernandez-Arias  (1990), 
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Let M be the surplus  allocated  to the multilateral  creditors;  B, the sur- 
plus allocated  to the bilateral  creditors;  P, the surplus  allocated  to pri- 
vate lenders;  and  C, the surplus  allocated  to the debtor  country.  Then  in 
any efficient  bargain, 
(10)  M + B + P  +  C =  S. 
We further  assume that  the multilaterals,  private  lenders, and debtor 
countries  care only about  the amounts  allocated  to them, so their  utilit- 
ies are UM(M),  UP(P), and Uc(C),  respectively. We also assume  that  the 
bilateral  creditors  have interests that are completely identical  to those 
of the donor countries that finance them. Thus they care about both 
themselves  and  the multilaterals-because they are liable  for any short- 
fall in the multilaterals'  accounts, or for a more altruistic  reason. Ac- 
cordingly,  we write  the utility  function  of the bilateral  as UB(B  +  oxM).25 
If any of the four  parties  do not subscribe  to an agreement,  then the sur- 
plus is zero and  each bargaining  party  receives a utility  of zero. 
To model multilateral  seniority, we assume that  the multilaterals  are 
capable  of making  a take-it-or-leave-it  offer  to the other  bargainers,  who 
then negotiate a surplus split among the three of them (subject to the 
constraint  of giving  the multilaterals  what  they want).26  In that  case, the 
multilaterals  will choose an outcome that  gives them as much  surplus  as 
possible, subject  to the legal rights  of the other  parties. 
Now consider a situation  in which a multilateral  has made loans of 
amount  R and  has decided  that  its current  objective  in the country  is sim- 
ply to withdraw  its funds and be repaid  as much as possible. What  will 
be the outcome of Nash bargaining  among  the remaining  participants? 
Assuming  that the debts owed to bilaterals  and to private  creditors 
25. Our  analysis  is meant  to be sufficiently  broad  to allow  for the multilaterals  and  bi- 
laterals  to contribute  aid  to the debtor  if the aid  project  will selfishly  benefit  the donor.  For 
example,  the Germans  may  finance  a project  to pay  the salaries  of Russian  soldiers  in east- 
ern Germany  if keeping  those soldiers  happy  also raises  the utility  of Germany.  Even if a 
donor  selfishly  benefits,  it is also possible  that  the donor,  as an official  creditor,  may  wish 
to be repaid  all or at least part  of its outstanding  debt. 
26. However,  the creditors  are  limited  as to how much  they can demand  by their  legal 
rights.  For  example,  the  debtor's  surplus  can  never  fall  below  what  it would  be if it covered 
all of its outstanding  obligations  and did not receive any aid projects. The commercial 
banks,  whose utility  is only dependent  on how much  they are  repaid,  cannot  receive  more 
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are  both sufficiently  large,  the outcome  will  be the simultaneous  solution 
of equation  10, and 
(11)  M=  R, 
so that 
(12)  Up(P)/Up(P)  U7(C)/Uc(C)  =  UB(B  +  otR)/UB(B  +  otR). 
In the case where  the bilateral  and  multilaterals  are  independent,  (x  = 
0. Then  an increase  in  R of one dollar  decreases  the surpluses  of all other 
bargainers.  For example, if each has a utility  function  that  is linear,  then 
if the multilaterals  are capable of demanding  an R  that is one dollar 
higher,  each of the other  three  bargainers  loses one-third  of a dollar. 
But what if ax  =  1, as would be the case if the industrialized  lending 
countries  fully incorporated  the value of the multilaterals  into their  util- 
ity functions?  Then the entire  burden  of the increase in R would fall on 
the bilaterals;  neither  the debtor  nor the private  creditors  would  be hurt 
by the increase  in this senior  obligation.27  Thus  even if the IFIs were paid 
off first, it is not necessarily  the case that  a rise in the IMF-World  Bank 
share of total nonconcessional  debt would adversely affect secondary 
market  prices  for private  debt. 
Note that  while we have used our  model  to analyze  the distribution  of 
repayments  to bilateral  and private  creditors  (given IFI seniority), the 
model  could equally  well be interpreted  as representing  the conflict  be- 
tween two bilaterals,  each of which  is responsible  for a different  fraction 
of IFI financing.  Effectively, each industrialized  country  would have to 
pay for its own share  of IFI repayments  through  its own bilateral  agen- 
cies. The implication  would  be that  the United States would  be required 
to bear some of the burden  created by new IFI loans to Russia, even 
though  the IFIs are  certain  to be repaid  and  the United States  has almost 
no other  loans outstanding.  Thus the bargaining  analysis here provides 
a rationale  for  our  treatment  of IMF  loans as equal  priority  in the burden- 
sharing  calculations  presented  earlier  in table 3 above. 
27. Note that  a higher  value  of (x  actually  decreases  the likelihood  that  the multilaterals 
will  have  to accept  anything  less than  their  promised  sums. If (x  = 0, then  the multilaterals 
will  be constrained  by the minimum  utilities  that  must  be offered  to each of the other  bar- 
gainers.  If multilateral  debt  is too large,  the multilaterals  may  have to ask for  less than  full 
repayment.  But  in the  extreme  case where  ox  = 1,  the multilaterals  can  always  be repaid  the 
full  amount  of their  legal  obligations;  they can always  count  on the bilaterals  contributing 
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Who Pays for  IFI Repayments  in Practice? 
In the preceding  model, we suggested  the possibility  of an aid neutral- 
ity hypothesis for IFI lending. In the extreme case where the IFIs are 
merely veils for industrialized  country  lending, then (because they are 
relatively  small)  any impact  of their  actions  on total aid flows or debt re- 
payments  will be fully offset by bilateral  creditors  and  aid agencies. Per- 
haps  the most suggestive  practical  example  of the type of repayment  re- 
shuffling described in  our bargaining model is  the  case  of  those 
developing  countries  that the World  Bank  calls its "reverse  graduates." 
These are countries that had been borrowing  from the World Bank's 
nonconcessional affiliate, the International  Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD);  however, because they suffered  from nega- 
tive growth, the World Bank switched them to concessional loans 
through  another World Bank affiliate, the International  Development 
Association (IDA). From 1985  to 1989,  20 reverse graduates  met all of 
their  obligations  from  previous  IBRD  loans with new financing  provided 
by IDA (see table  7). Tanzania,  for example, received $413  million  from 
IDA, from which it had to pay $196 million  to IBRD. The World  Bank 
has even established  a special IDA "reflow"  facility specifically  to pro- 
vide the reverse graduates  with the extra  funds needed to meet the bur- 
den of their  IBRD  loans. 
Similarly,  it has been argued  that  much  of recent  World  Bank  aid has 
simply "crossed 19th  Street" (the Washington,  D.C., street that sepa- 
rates  World  Bank  and  IMF  headquarters)  and  has been used to repay  the 
IMF. For example, IDA gave $8.71 billion  in net transfers  to sub-Saha- 
ran Africa from 1985-90. Of this amount, $1.69 billion was used for 
IBRD repayments  and even more-$3.97  billion-found  its way to the 
IMF.28  (This  gives credence to the IMF's view that  it is at the top of the 
IFI food chain.29) 
Even in cases in which  the IBRD  and  the IMF have been repaid  with- 
out the help of IDA, legal and economic repayments  still may differ. It 
is well known  that Cote d'Ivoire received a special "loan"  from France 
28. World  Bank  (1991  a, vol. 1). 
29. Generally  speaking,  a country  must  be in good standing  with  the IMF  to receive  an 
IBRD  loan. During  the 1980s,  the World  Bank  experimented  with  making  sectoral  adjust- 
ment  loans  to countries  that  had  not yet reached  a standby  agreement  with  the IMF. This 
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Table 7.  Debt Transfers of Low-Income Countries That Repaid IBRD Debt 
with IDA Funds, 1985-89 
Millions of U.S.  dollars 
Net  transfers 
IBRD  IDA  from  World 
Coiintiy  payments  receipts  Bank  IBRD debta 
Bangladesh  24  1,419  1,395  61 
Bolivia  166  225  58  189 
Ethiopia  55  277  222  28 
Ghana  93  767  674  109 
Guinea  64  199  135  31 
Kenya  451  468  17  853 
Liberiab  22  27  5  133 
Madagascar  18  372  354  26 
Malawi  34  279  245  89 
Mauritania  43  94  51  168 
Senegal  65  346  281  92 
Sierra Leone  3  20  17  10 
Sri Lanka  34  323  289  80 
Sudan  43  337  294  23 
Tanzania  196  413  217  238 
Togo  36  177  141  1 
Uganda  28  414  386  34 
Zaire  60  583  523  43 
Zambiab  34  185  151  506 
Zimbabwe  23  26  3  353 
Total  1,492  6,951  5,458  3,067 
Source:  World Bank (1991a, vol.  2). 
a.  IBRD debt as of June 30,  1990, is shown. 
b.  Liberia and Zambia have been in default to IBRD and IDA. 
specifically  to meet an IBRD payment  upon which it otherwise would 
have  defaulted.  Similarly,  from 1985  to 1989,  another  14  countries  argua- 
bly repaid  the World  Bank  out of funds  they received from  other  official 
creditors,  as table  8 shows. In most countries,  the multilaterals  extended 
a relatively  small  proportion  of total official  loans and grants, so it is at 
least  plausible  that  IFI decisions are to some extent undone  by the bilat- 
erals. 
Although  the evidence on the reverse graduates  is suggestive of the 
type of bargaining  described  in our model, the evidence must be inter- 
preted  with some caution. Clearly, if World  Bank officials adjust  IDA 
aid upward  dollar-for-dollar  to cover IBRD repayments,  then the mar- 
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Table 8.  Debt Transfers of Middle-Income Countries That Repaid the World Bank 
with Other Official Money,  1985-89 
Millions of U.S.  dollars 
Other official  Total official 
creditors,  creditors, 
World Bank  grants plus  grants  pllus 
Coluntiy  net transfers  net transfers  net  transfers 
Botswana  -  56  444  388 
Costa Rica  -99  372  273 
Cote d'lvoire  -226  681  455 
Dominican  Republic  -70  474  404 
Egypt  -299  4,420  4,121 
El Salvador  -63  1,195  1,132 
Guatemalaa  -  120  400  280 
Hondurasa  -  77  972  895 
Lebanonb  -25  211  186 
Mauritania  -  19  177  158 
Paraguay  -165  375  210 
Philippines  -829  2,841  2,012 
Swaziland  -  33  73  40 
Syriaa  -  37  2,122  2,085 
Total  -  2,118  14,757  12,639 
Source:  World Bank (1991a, vol.  2). 
a.  Guatemala,  Honduras,  and Syria have reached  nonaccrual status with the World Bank. 
b.  Figures for Lebanon  exclude  negative grants of $946 million in 1985. 
zero. However, if a reverse  graduate's  net transfers  from  IDA (and  other 
sources)  are  independent  of its IBRD  obligations,  then the marginal  bur- 
den of IBRD debt is 100  cents on the dollar. 
An interesting  topic  for  future  research-but beyond  the scope of this 
paper-would be to try to see to what  extent IFI decisions affected  total 
aid to a country, holding  constant standard  aid factors (such as income 
per  capita,  trade  with  the major  industrialized  country  donors,  and  polit- 
ical alignment  with the donors). 
Do IFIs Fill Missing Loan Markets? 
The superior  ability of official lenders to enforce repayments  from 
sovereign  countries  is one of the main  arguments  generally  used to jus- 
tify why aid  is provided  in the form  of conditional  loans, rather  than  con- 
ditional  grants.  If because of their  political  power, international  lending Jeremy Builow, Ken1neth  Rogoff,  and Afonso S. Bevila qua  221 
agencies can better enforce debt repayments  from sovereign govern- 
ments than  can private  lenders, then the IFIs' practice  of making  loans 
instead  of making  grants  enhances  the efficiency  of international  capital 
markets.  But  if IFIs are  only senior  in the narrower  sense of being  able  to 
get repaid  ahead  of private  creditors  without  increasing  the total  amount 
countries  repay, then the efficiency  argument  is spurious. 
Again, the key to thinking  about this problem  is to think about the 
marginal  value of debt. In the conventional  finance  model that we em- 
ployed in the early part  of the paper, the marginal  value of debt is inde- 
pendent  of the seniority  of the new lender.  The implication  is that  all new 
lenders, regardless of seniority, have the same impact on the total 
amount  countries  will repay. The missing  markets  model of IFI lending 
posits that the marginal  value of IFI debt is greater  than the marginal 
value for other  types of debt.30 
If the marginal  value of official  debt is indeed greater  than the mar- 
ginal  value of private  debt, then our secondary  market  results  in table 5 
become difficult  to interpret.  As an extreme example, suppose that the 
presence of official creditors raises the amount the debtor country is 
willing  to pay by one dollar  for every dollar  in official  debt, even in cases 
in which the country  is in partial  default. In this case, the value of mar- 
ginal  debt is one for official  creditors.  Suppose  further  that  official  credi- 
tors are strictly senior. Then, even though  official  creditors  are senior, 
their  presence has no effect on private  creditors.  Thus  although  our sec- 
ondary  market  regressions  are suggestive, they do not capture  this non- 
conventional  type of seniority. 
Still, an observer  of LDC debt renegotiations  would be hard-pressed 
to argue  that official  creditors  are better able and willing  to enforce re- 
payments than private creditors. Why has the replacement  of private 
debt with IFI debt in Mexico and other Brady  plan countries  lessened 
the debt crisis? Generally  speaking,  the extensive evolution of private 
capital  markets  over the past twenty years makes  the missing  market  ra- 
tionale  for IFI lending  considerably  more dubious  than in the years im- 
mediately  following  the Bretton  Woods agreement. 
Of course, there are other arguments-besides  increasing capital 
market  efficiency-for  having IFIs provide loans rather than grants. 
30. Fernandez-Arias  and Demigurac-Kunt  (1991) discuss other rationales  for IFI 
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Loan guarantees  are easier for some governments  to pass by their  elec- 
torates. Borrowers  may sometimes find  the obligation  to repay  foreign 
debts helpful  in convincing  their  populace  to accept tough  domestic ad- 
justment  programs.  But none of these other  arguments  is nearly  as com- 
pelling  in economic  terms  as the argument  that  IFI or other  official  loans 
directly  enhance  the efficiency  of capital  markets. 
Conclusion 
The IMF  and  the World  Bank  are  the only international  organizations 
with  the capacity  to provide  the level of coordinated  technical  assistance 
needed  to deal with  the massive economic  reform  problems  facing  East- 
ern Europe  and the former  Soviet republics.  Their  technical  assistance 
is needed as part  of any loan or grant  package.  However, it is a mistake 
to believe that by channeling  the financial  component  of aid as noncon- 
cessional IFI loans, the industrialized  countries can somehow "lever" 
aid. First, our  theoretical  and  empirical  analysis  challenges  the view that 
IFI debt is senior in an economically meaningful  way. The apparent 
"me-first"  seniority  status of these organizations  may well come largely 
at the expense of bilateral  government  creditors  and other aid agencies 
run  by the industrialized  countries  that sponsor  the IFIs. 
Second, even if new official  loans to the republics  of the  former  Soviet 
Union will be paid ahead of other creditors, the "leverage"  that these 
loans provide may come substantially  at the expense of existing credi- 
tors, who consist largely  of taxpayers  and government  agencies in the 
industrialized  countries. Because Germany  holds a much greater  pro- 
portion  of existing  FSU debt  than  does the United  States, the actual  cost 
to the United States of FSU loans is far smaller  than  its IFI quota share 
would suggest. 
Our  analysis  does not attempt  to determine  the right  amount  of aid to 
supply  the former  Soviet bloc. We take as given that  the region  requires 
significant  net transfers.  Nevertheless, in comparing  alternative  multi- 
lateral  packages,  it is helpful  to have as clear a picture  as possible of the 
total costs to each donor. Comments 
and Discussion 
Susan Collins: This paper  covers a range  of topics about  lending  by the 
IMF and other international  financial  institutions  (IFIs). In particular, 
Jeremy  Bulow, Kenneth  Rogoff, and  Afonso Bevilaqua  analyze  the bur- 
den-sharing  to G-7 donors  implicit  in alternative  ways to finance  capital 
flows to the East. They then examine whether  official debts are effec- 
tively senior to private debts and discusses institutional  linkages be- 
tween official  creditors.  The authors  pull these pieces together  to draw 
implications  for the role of IFIs in aiding  the former  Soviet bloc. For the 
most  part,  I found  the discussion  of individual  issues interesting  and  pro- 
vocative. The discussion of burden-sharing  is timely and informative. 
The analysis of linkages between creditors  is worthy of further  explo- 
ration. 
However, the authors'  claim  that  the pieces taken  together  imply  that 
it would be a mistake to provide financing  for the former Soviet bloc 
through IFI loans-as  opposed to private loans or official grants- 
struck  me as something  of a non sequitur.  An analysis  of the appropriate 
role for the IMF and other multilateral  institutions  requires  considera- 
tion of many  important  issues that are not incorporated  into this paper. 
First, I will discuss the analyses of burden-sharing  and of IFI loan se- 
niority.  Then I return  to more general  issues of financial  assistance for 
the former  Soviet bloc. 
Developed  countries  have agreed  to provide  some financial  resources 
to the former  Soviet bloc, although  the amounts  and the forms of this 
assistance  remain  uncertain.  Bulow  and  Rogoff  begin  their  paper  by ask- 
ing  whether  the form  of assistance  matters  from  creditors'  perspectives. 
They show clearly and conclusively that different  creditors  have very 
different  interests,  given  that  existing  loans to the former  Soviet bloc are 
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unevenly  distributed  among  the countries  that are preparing  to provide 
additional  resources. Germany, in particular, has large outstanding 
loans to the region.  Thus Germany  would bear considerably  less of the 
net cost of a resource  transfer  if the transfer  came in the form of a loan 
partly  earmarked  for debt repayments,  rather  than  in the form  of grants. 
The United States and other countries  with small outstanding  loans to 
the region would bear considerably  more of the cost of a transfer  that 
came in the form of a partially  earmarked  loan, rather  than as a simple 
grant. Of course, another  implication  of the analysis is that part of the 
U.S. contribution  to such an earmarked  loan would  go toward  repaying 
the region's existing debts, rather  than to assisting the region's transi- 
tion. The burden-sharing  implications  of alternative  forms  of assistance 
deserve a prominent  place in discussions about  providing  assistance to 
the former  Soviet bloc. The authors  have done a useful service in spell- 
ing out this point. 
The  paper  then  goes on to ask whether  official  debt  is treated  as senior 
by developing  country  borrowers.  The main  concern here is about the 
seniority  of IMF lending,  and ultimately  about  the role for IMF lending 
in assisting the former Soviet bloc. Two sets of information  are pre- 
sented to assess official debt seniority. I found this evidence sugges- 
tive-but  not conclusive. 
First, table  4 shows that, on average,  repayment  rates  by severely in- 
debted middle-income  countries to private creditors have exceeded 
those to official  creditors.  While  quite  interesting,  this need not say any- 
thing about the extent to which debtors treat official claims as senior. 
To make  the point, suppose there were two types of countries.  Type X 
countries  are known to have a low probability  of repayment.  They are 
unable  to borrow  much  from  private  creditors  and  those that  do accumu- 
late debts borrow  primarily  from  official  sources. Type Y countries  are 
known  to have a high  probability  of repayment.  They  tend  to accumulate 
high proportions  of private  debt. Under these circumstances,  it would 
be no surprise  to observe  higher  repayment  rates  on private  lending  (that 
is, by type Y countries),  even if all countries  treated  official  debt as se- 
nior. This difference  in observed  repayment  rates could be exacerbated 
by private  creditors  charging  higher  interest  rates  than  official  creditors. 
Second, Bulow, Rogoff, and Bevilaqua  present regression analysis 
examining  whether  secondary  market  debt prices are influenced  by the 
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cerned  with  the probable  endogeneity  of this right-hand-side  variable  (as 
discussed above) and with the problem  of selection bias pointed  out re- 
cently by Ozler  and  Huizinga.  I  However, none of the specifications  pro- 
vide much support  for the view that participants  in these markets  value 
official  and  private  debt differently.  The results  are quite  interesting  and 
may benefit from additional  analysis. It is also worth noting that they 
provide  ajustification  for the use of secondary  market  prices in the valu- 
ation of official  debts for the burden-sharing  calculations  at the begin- 
ning  of the paper. 
Nonetheless, it is far  from  clear what these regressions  say about  se- 
niority.  As pointed  out in the paper,  they may  imply  that  secondary  mar- 
ket participants  view the presence of official debt as irrelevant  for the 
expected value of private debts, given other country characteristics. 
Also, even if secondary  markets  value official  and private  debt equally, 
prices in these markets  may be poor indicators  of the underlying  social 
values of the two types of debts. I will return  to this point below. 
The paper  also points out that a number  of countries  that repaid  low 
concessionary IFI loans did so with funds provided by other official 
sources. This includes so-called reverse graduates  of the World Bank 
that  repaid  the IMF and  IBRD from  long-term  concessional IDA funds. 
Another  example is not discussed in the paper. Countries  in arrears  to 
the IMF have at times been brought  back into the fold with  the help of a 
friendly  government  that takes the lead in passing a hat to raise funds 
from bilateral  sources. Those funds are then used to repay the arrears 
and  return  the country  to good standing  with the IMF. 
It is certainly true that the IMF often gets repaid, not because the 
macroeconomic  imbalances  that  precipitated  the initial  crisis have been 
resolved, but because of access to additional  resources. The examples 
above illustrate  this fact. However, they seem to me to have less to do 
with  the question  of whether  official  lending  is senior  than  with  the long- 
standing  debate  about  whether  short-term  revolving  IMF  credits  should 
be used to finance  long-term  structural  adjustments.  This debate  is rele- 
vant  for economies of the former  Soviet bloc, as well as for developing 
countries. 
What  does all of this say about seniority?  The authors  reach three 
conclusions:  that IFIs are senior only in the narrow  sense that they get 
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repaid  first;  that these institutions  do not increase  the total amount  that 
countries  repay;  and  therefore,  that  they do not increase  capital  market 
efficiency.  The authors  go on to argue  that  these conclusions  remove  the 
key rationale  for financing  the countries  of the former  Soviet bloc (and 
presumably  less-developed  countries,  as well) through  nonconcessional 
IFI loans. In my view, the evidence points to a much more ambiguous 
set of conclusions. But more importantly,  acceptance of the authors' 
version  would  be far  from  enough  to make  ajudgment  about  the role for 
IFI lending. 
I would summarize  the main  results  as follows. First, the IMF  in par- 
ticular  does appear  to be senior in the sense that its short-term  loans do 
get repaid.  (Note that  because many  debtors  continue  to receive net re- 
source transfers  from  the World  Bank, it often makes sense for them to 
repay World  Bank loans, as well. This point is not discussed in the pa- 
per.) However, secondary market  participants  do not appear  to value 
official  debts more highly  than  private  debts. Also, repayments  of IMF 
and  other  non-concessional  IFI loans do not always come from  a debtor 
country's own resources. Quite a bit of taking  from Peter (for  example, 
IDA) to pay Paul (that  is, the IMF) occurs. This in part  may reflect  the 
linkages  among  various  official  creditors. 
These points  touch on only part  of the broader  issue of what  role non- 
concessional  IFI loans should  play. I do not agree  that  the ability  of IFIs 
to increase  total repayment  is the primary  rationale  for this type of lend- 
ing. As important,  if not more so, are issues such as "missing  markets" 
and the political economy of external borrowing  and lending;  the au- 
thors mention  these much  too briefly  at the end of their  paper. 
In addition,  there  are  good reasons  to believe that  the expected social 
returns  to supporting  transition  in the former Soviet bloc may exceed 
the expected private  returns;  thus private  creditors  may not provide  the 
optimal  level of financing-especially in the short run. Secondary  mar- 
ket prices will not reflect  social valuations  that  differ  from  private  ones. 
Thus the paper's emphasis on these prices in the discussion of official 
financing  may  be misleading.  This issue deserves a serious  discussion  in 
any analysis  of the role for official  lending. 
The paper  implicitly  presents another  argument  against  IFI loans to 
the former  Soviet bloc that  is worth  making  explicit. Short-term  loans at 
market  rates (such as IMF credits) extended today run a great risk of 
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ments  eventually  stepping  in to help  bail  out countries  in trouble.  Would 
it make sense to avoid the likelihood of high negotiation costs and 
bailouts  by simply  providing  direct concessional credits up front?  This 
seems to me a clearer  way to frame  the underlying  question  than  through 
the authors'  lens of seniority.  It is a very general  question  that  does not 
have a simple  answer. The remainder  of my comments  raise some addi- 
tional  considerations  that  I believe are central  for tackling  it adequately. 
Suppose  the West has decided on an amount  of resources  to provide 
the East. A comprehensive  discussion  of how those resources  should  be 
provided  needs to distinguish  between at least three separate  issues: co- 
ordination,  terms, and conditionality.  A real need exists to coordinate 
the assistance of potentially  dozens of well-meaning  governments.  The 
IMF  is one sensible institution  to play this role. However, agreeing  on a 
coordinator  quickly  may well be more important  than finding  (or creat- 
ing)  the perfect  one. 
What  are  appropriate  terms  for the financing?  On  the one hand,  short- 
term revolving  credits may be ill-suited  to finance  long-term  structural 
adjustments.  On  the other  hand,  dismissing  nonconcessional  IFI credits 
in favor  of bilateral  grants  (or  private  loans) is simplistic  and  unrealistic. 
Funds  for concessional  lending  appear  quite  limited  and  must  be divided 
among  a large  number  of competing  uses. 
How much  concessional  financing  the former  Soviet bloc will receive 
is very difficult  to predict.  One  possible benchmark  comes from  looking 
at the annual  official  development  assistance (ODA)  provided  to devel- 
oping countries. (Overall,  ODA from the United States has an interest 
rate of 2.5 percent and a repayment  period of 27 years, with a 9-year 
grace  period.)  Suppose  the countries  of Eastern  and  Central  Europe  and 
the former Soviet Union (FSU) were treated "like"  developing coun- 
tries, in the sense that they received the same amounts  of ODA as the 
average  LDC with the same per capita  income level and population.  If 
so, the countries  of Eastern  and Central  Europe  and the FSU would re- 
ceive about $2.5 billion and $6.0 billion in ODA a year, respectively. 
(These figures  are based on a regression  analysis of 65 ODA recipients 
from 1987  to 1989.)  Even if amounts  of this magnitude  are  forthcoming, 
plenty  of room  may exist for other  types of financing. 
Finally,  the debate  over conditionality-and the role  of the IMF-has 
been long and  heated;  a full treatment  is beyond the scope of these com- 
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cial inflows is important  to guard  against  the possibility that the funds 
simply  enable governments  to postpone difficult  but necessary adjust- 
ments. On the macroeconomic  front, I also believe that considerable 
consensus exists about what adjustments  should be made. The real 
problem  here is often over the politics of houw  to get these things  done. 
The key political  issues can be country-specific  and may not be an area 
of IMF  expertise.  This  consideration  may  well point  to a role  for the IMF 
in conjunction  with  others;  however, broader  involvement  need not pre- 
clude  a role  for the IMF  or other  IFIs. Here  again  is an area  that  warrants 
attention  as the international  community  decides how to assist the East. 
Michael Bruno: As the IFIs and particularly  the IMF prepare  to chan- 
nel very large  sums of credit  to the former  Soviet Union during  the next 
four years, some interesting  questions arise about the form that aid 
should  take and  the burden  that  donors  and creditors  should  share. The 
authors  address  many  of these questions  in this  provocative  paper.  They 
ask what is the value to the creditors  of such a large  additional  aid pack- 
age, given that sizable sums of unrepaid  debt remain  outstanding?  Are 
the IFIs the most efficient  way to channel the additional  money (apart 
from their accepted role of providing  technical  assistance)?  Putting  the 
question  in another  form, are the IFIs senior  to other creditors,  such as 
government  bilateral  lending  or private  banks?  Do the IFIs have special 
collection techniques  that make them a more efficient channel  for G-7 
credit?  How does one empirically  establish  the existence of such senior- 
ity when no market  for IFI debt exists? Why give aid mainly  as loans 
rather  than  as grants?  How does one correctly  measure  the burden-shar- 
ing among  the G-7 countries, given that their initial  debt is not propor- 
tional to their quotas in the IFIs and that additional  lending  may affect 
the value of existing debt disproportionately?  Lastly, given that past 
transfers  have flowed in both directions  and among  different  creditors 
and borrowers,  can one say who bailed  out whom? 
To address these questions, Jeremy Bulow, Kenneth Rogoff, and 
Afonso S. Bevilaqua  have embarked  on an ambitious  and important  re- 
search  project,  which continues  and  expands some of their  earlier  work 
on seniority  and  the marginal  value  of debt. Unfortunately,  in this paper, 
too many  of these issues are  tackled  simultaneously.  As a result,  some of 
the operational  answers  given may  either  be misleading  or insufficiently 
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real effective cost to the creditors  of extending  new credit to the FSU; 
examining  seniority;  and  defining  the role of the IFIs. Each of these top- 
ics could be the subject  of detailed  investigation  in its own right.  On the 
other hand, the plurality  of questions that the paper  raises and the con- 
troversial  nature  of the answers it gives may distract  readers  from the 
important  area  in which the authors'  research  contributes  the most new 
insights:  the complex question of burden-sharing  and the nature  of the 
bargaining  process among  the industrial  countries. 
Let me start with the authors' two most controversial  claims: that 
their "empirical  analysis indicates  that creditors  as a whole would lose 
on the order  of 90 cents for each dollar  of new IFI loans they extend to 
the republic  of Russia";  and  that  their  estimates  of "the  low marginal  val- 
ues of debt . . . imply  that  the total burden  of new loans to most Eastern 
European  countries will be close to the burden  of outright  grants, re- 
gardless  of whether  the new lenders  are senior  or not." 
The concept of the marginal  value of debt, as distinct  from the aver- 
age market  price, can be useful in a particular  case: considering  the ef- 
fect on existing  creditors  of channeling  relatively  small  amounts  of addi- 
tional  debt into a country  that has been in debt for a long time; where a 
well-functioning  secondary  market  for its private  debt exists; and  where 
no fundamental  change of policy regime is envisaged. None of these 
conditions  hold in the case of the former  Soviet bloc. It is not clear  what 
the recent  price of 40 cents on the dollar  on the market  for Russian  debt 
really measures. The authors themselves question whether the much 
higher  price of 70 quoted  for Hungary  may be too low because Hungary 
has been able to borrow limited amounts on private markets  in 1992. 
Would  the same  argument  not apply  to Russia,  once it undergoes  a major 
stabilization  and restructuring  program  with proper  IMF conditionality 
attached?  How can  one extrapolate  from  shaky  past market  prices  about 
the likely  effect on the future  Russian  debt  price-let  alone the marginal 
value of debt-once  the total external debt of the FSU more or less 
doubles  from its current  and not very high level of $200  per capita (see 
table 1)? 
Of course, there  is some likelihood  that  the massive aid  effort  that  the 
G-7 is contemplating  will not leave the FSU better off and that another 
debt crisis may  loom a few years ahead. But is it reasonable  to consider 
this a virtual  certainty  from  the start?  Neither the current  subscribers  to 
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rate, it would seem very far-fetched  to deduce that premise  from past 
observations  based on a very thin market  for private  debt. 
The authors  are much  more  cautious  with  their  claim  that seniority  of 
the IFIs over other creditors  cannot be established.  The attempt  to get 
at seniority  indirectly  through  regressions  of market  price of debt on the 
share  of official  debt is interesting  (see table 5). Unfortunately,  for the 
one regression  that may be valid (the regression  with instrumental  vari- 
ables) the claim is at least put into serious doubt, as the authors  them- 
selves admit.  They are also frank  in admitting  that  the regression  results 
do not get at the "nonconventional"  type of seniority, namely the type 
that would assign  a higher  marginal  value to official  debt than  to private 
debt. Somehow, even though  no clear market  test is available,  I find it 
hard  to believe that the credit of IFIs, and particularly  the IMF, which 
comes with so many  strings  of conditionality  attached,  does not on aver- 
age have a higher  standing  both in the eyes of borrowers  (thus making 
the credit senior in the narrow  sense that it would be repaid  first), and 
also in terms of its policy effectiveness (thus enhancing  a borrowing 
country's  ability  to repay  its total debt). 
This question is closely tied to the issue of the special role that the 
IFIs play and  the question  of whether  they replace  any missing  markets. 
It is hard  to envisage an institution  such as the IMF or IBRD as being 
effective in promoting  or supporting  a country's adjustment  and struc- 
tural  reform  agenda were it not also a creditor  itself to the country in 
question. As to the issue of why the IFIs should extend loans, rather 
than simply  grants, sufficient  reasons exist-both  economic and politi- 
co-economic, most of which are internal  to the creditor  countries. The 
authors  themselves  mention  some of these. In particular,  a mutual  bene- 
fit exists to having  an ongoing  process of loan surveillance;  this would 
account for the preponderance  of loans, rather than grants. Finally, 
while  the authors  may  be correct  in their  claim  that  "the  extensive evolu- 
tion of private capital markets over the past twenty years makes the 
missing markets rationale  for IFI lending considerably more dubious 
than  in the years immediately  following  the Bretton  Woods  agreement," 
it remains  a fact that  the massive injection  of capital  that  in all  likelihood 
will be channeled  into the FSU with  the aim  of bringing  about  a quantum 
change has not and would not be likely to come from private  markets. 
So something  is still missing  in these markets  and will probably  always 
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While I have been somewhat  critical  of the authors'  analyses of the 
overall implications  and costs of a large aid package, I find their bar- 
gaining  models and their  attempts  at empirical  application  to questions 
of burden-sharing  very suggestive  and  interesting  and  well worth  devel- 
oping  further.  One line of reasoning  that  follows from  the application  of 
the marginal  value  of debt  concept stresses the fact that  a highly  unequal 
share  in an existing  debt (as in the FSU's case, in which Germany  holds 
43 percent,  while the United States holds only 1 percent)  implies  a very 
unequal  effective burden-sharing  of the cost of new debt, unless the new 
loans greatly  enhance the borrowers'  capacity to repay their old debt, 
including  possibly  being  earmarked  to repay  specific  old debt. Given  our 
previous  reservations  about  the estimate  of the marginal  debt  value, one 
would  have to be very careful  with  the relative  numbers  that  come out of 
such an exercise, but the principle  is certainly  valid. Given the previous 
discussion, however, the same type of reasoning  could also be applied 
in the positive direction:  if the new aid package  turns  out to be the start 
of a major  reform,  don't the Germans  stand  a better  chance of salvaging 
a larger  part  of the old debt? If so, their  gain  from a successful package 
would  be greater  than  that  of the other  G-7 donors. 
When  countries  bargain  for their share  of the burden,  both the bilat- 
eral and the multilateral  role of individual  governments  must be taken 
into account, as is done nicely in the authors' model. One additional 
thought  comes to mind:  in the utility  functions  of the bargainers  in some 
of the recent debt reschedulings,  governments  may have included  not 
only bilateral  and multilateral  considerations,  but also have given some 
weight  to the extent to which their own country's banking  system was 
involved  in the regions  in question.  Those banks,  after  all, provide  some 
of the tax revenue  (and  loss) in their  respective  home countries. 
In practice, the authors  probably  argue correctly that the seniority 
status  of the IFIs may well come largely  at the expense of bilateral  gov- 
ernment  creditors and other agencies run by the IFIs' industrialized- 
country  sponsors.  The empirical  analysis  of repayments  done with  other 
other  official  money suggests  the need to do the overall  accounting  more 
thoroughly.  At the same time, there is not much to the argument  "that 
much  of recent  World  Bank  aid has simply 'crossed 19th  street' .  .  .  and 
has been  used to repay  the IMF."  It is not surprising  that  the IMF  comes 
in first  to a distressed  country  and gives short-term  adjustment  lending, 
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investment  loans. It is, in fact, inherent  to the natural  division of work 
(or what has remained  of it) between the two great Bretton Woods 
institutions. 
All in all, this is a provocative  paper  written  by authors  who have al- 
ready contributed  considerably  to our thinking  on these subjects and 
who should  be encouraged  to continue  with  their  work. The role of insti- 
tutions and of policies should always be questioned  from new angles. 
Policymakers,  however, should also be aware  that new insights  do not 
necessarily and immediately  lead to new practical  answers before the 
tools have been given a chance to be perfected. 
General  Discussion 
Stanley Fischer  found the notion of seniority  unclear  and cited three 
alternative  concepts of seniority that do not involve market  pricing  of 
debt and could be employed to examine IFI seniority. First, in no case 
has a private  creditor  been repaid  before one of the international  inter- 
mediaries.  Second, IFI bonds issued to cover loans to developing  coun- 
tries are better  investments  than  corresponding  bonds of private  banks. 
According to these concepts, the IFIs clearly are senior creditors. 
Third, because of the commitment  by governments-and  ultimately, 
taxpayers,  who have implicitly  undertaken  to provide  financing  as nec- 
essary to the IFI's client countries-the  IFIs as institutions  are them- 
selves senior creditors  that will get serviced, if anybody does. Fischer 
could not see how the analysis  of actual  net transfers  in the 1980s  could 
reveal  anything  relevant  about  seniority.  The IFIs saw it as their  mission 
to provide  net transfers  precisely when private  creditors  were trying  to 
withdraw.  This had  nothing  to do with  which  creditors  were in a position 
to get serviced  ahead  of others. 
Fischer  added  that  the actions by governments  to help out the private 
banks  in this period, by providing  net transfers  when bank  repayments 
were threatened,  was a separate  decision and not a matter  of seniority. 
He hoped that, in a similar situation in the future, private creditors 
would  be left to deal with their  own problems. 
Lewis Alexander  pointed  out that  the ex post return  on debt  by differ- 
ent creditors  would not, in general, reveal which creditor  was senior. 
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would  expect higher  returns  to compensate  for the greater  risk of being 
junior. For a relatively  short period  following  a negative shock, senior 
creditors  might  buy out junior creditors, if bankruptcy  costs were sig- 
nificant  and  the long-term  prospects  for solvency were reasonable.  This 
is one possible explanation  for the behavior  of official  creditors  during 
the 1980s.  Regressions  presented in this paper  cannot hope to sort out 
these possibilities. 
Several panelists questioned  whether  grants  would be preferable  to 
concessional  loans as a way of providing  economic assistance. Fischer 
observed that loans carry the possibility of repayment  if a project or 
country  turns out well. He reasoned that Russia should receive loans 
rather  than  grants  because it was likely to be able  to repay  loans. He also 
stressed  that  loans established  a desirable  ongoing  relationship  between 
borrower  and lender  in a way that grants  do not. Alexander  added  that 
it is politically  easier for donor countries  to provide  assistance through 
loans, rather  than  through  grants.  Martin  Baily noted that  grants  to Rus- 
sia, by postponing  the need to transform  the economy, could slow the 
processes of change necessary for development. He considered loans 
preferable  because they could more  easily be related  to needed  develop- 
ment projects and because they required  repayment, making  it more 
likely they would be used for investment. William  Brainard  reasoned 
that  a large  discrepancy  probably  existed between  the social and  private 
returns  on either  grants  or loans to the former  Soviet Union. Moreover, 
great uncertainty exists about whether good or bad outcomes will 
emerge  from  the current  reform  attempts  in Russia  and  the other  former 
republics.  Loans have the advantage  of being  repaid  if the outcomes  are 
good, while providing  at least as much current  assistance as grants  to 
minimize  the risk  of bad  outcomes. 234  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1992 
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